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RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3079

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS 
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/31/2017 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ASEC TT
SUBJECT: THE STATE OF FRETILIN 
 
REF: DILI 255, DILI 281 
 
DILI 00000306  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political/Economic Officer, 
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In the days immediately following the August 5 
announcement of the new government, led by the four-party 
Alliance with a Parliamentary Majority (AMP), supporters of the 
previous ruling party FRETILIN launched a campaign of violence 
and intimidation primarily concentrated in the three eastern 
districts where their support remains strong. FRETILIN national 
leaders insisted that they had nothing to do with the violence, 
but observers generally concluded that the evidence belied this 
disavowal and that at least some instigation and orchestration 
was involved.  FRETILIN leadership have since made a concerted 
effort to rein in the violent reactions, likely in large part 
due to the recognition that the violence was damaging FRETILIN's 
image both domestically and internationally.  However, it is 
also clear that FRETILIN plans to keep up the pressure on the 
AMP government, continuing its consistent broadcast that the AMP 
government is illegitimate, publicly attacking some members of 
the new government for their alleged pro-Indonesian records, and 
preparing to play hardball in Parliament.  Meanwhile, FRETILIN's 
internal dynamics are shifting as the party comes to terms with 
its greatly reduced support base and ejection from government. 
While party leadership typically maintains a united front in 
public, unhappiness with the leadership of former Prime Minister 
and party secretary general Mari Alkatiri may be growing, with 
both long-time allies and the younger generation carefully 
maneuvering for leadership change.  With all its troubles, 
FRETILIN remains the largest, best organized and most deeply 
historically rooted Timorese party.  While it has disruptive and 
sometimes destructive potential, it also has some of the most 
committed and skilled leaders, and could still manage to return 
to power within this five-year period if the AMP's unity fails. 
The USG should engage robustly with both current leadership and 
potential future leadership to promote good lines of 
communication and influence and to ensure that we understand as 
best as possible where it is going.  End summary. 
 
A violent reaction to the AMP Government 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In the days immediately following the August 5 
announcement of the new government supporters of the previous 
ruling party FRETILIN launched a campaign of violence and 
intimidation primarily concentrated in the eastern districts of 
Baucau, Viqueque, and Lautem, where their support remains 
strong.  The campaign brought most normal activity to a 
standstill as boycott calls resulted in government offices, 
schools and businesses closing.  A number of both government and 
non-governmental organizations' offices were burnt down in 
Baucau; hundreds of houses were burnt in Viqueque; the road from 
Baucau to Viqueque became a no-go zone due to ongoing road 
blocks and attacks on vehicles rendering the latter 
inaccessible; and many individuals identified as anti-FRETILIN, 
including supporters of other political parties and journalists, 
fled their homes and went into hiding.  The UN estimates that 
approximately 4,000 people in the East were newly displaced in 
the process.  Internationals, particularly UN police responding 
to and attempting to control the violence, also were targeted 
with the worst incident being a well-staged and potentially 
deadly attack on a UN Police escorted convoy on August 10, which 
included a major rock throwing attack, the isolation of one 
vehicle which was then burned after its occupants escaped, and 
shots fired in the vicinity believed to be in the direction of 
the convoy.  In Dili, the disruption was less dramatic and 
relative normality returned quickly, but nonetheless left dozens 
of internationals and non-FRETILIN supporters with car windows 
smashed by rock throwing attacks and the customs building gutted 
by a fire that is widely viewed as an inside job designed to 
destroy potentially incriminating evidence.  Pro-FRETILIN 
attackers also burned some public buildings in Oecusse and 
Manufahi districts during this period. 
 
¶3. (SBU) FRETILIN national leaders insisted that they had 
nothing to do with the violence, and that they were doing 
everything they could to encourage non-violent responses. 
 
DILI 00000306  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
However, a wide array of both international and national 
observers concluded that the evidence belied this disavowal to a 
great extent.  As reported in reftels, the announcement of the 
new government had been preceded by a month in which FRETILIN 
leadership worked to rally its supporters in opposition to any 
government that excluded the party.  A steady stream of 
statements asserting the illegitimacy of the new government and 
the need to oppose it were widely seen as adding fuel to the 
fire. Moreover, reports from the East clearly indicated a 
significant level of local orchestration of the rioting and 
burning mobs by local FRETILIN leaders, know to report directly 
to national leaders.  Overall it appeared that FRETILIN was 
playing a double game, trying to maintain their respectability, 
while testing their ability to mobilize large numbers and make 
governance very difficult for the AMP. 
 
Reining in the violence, but keeping the pressure on 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Although tensions remain high especially in the East, 
the attacks and burnings subsided significantly following the 
first several days, and life is slowly returning to normal, in 
large part it seems because of a FRETILIN effort to rein things 
in.  Nonetheless, the eastern districts are expected to remain 
tense and volatile in the coming months. Several considerations 
appear to have been at play in this change of direction.  First, 
UN political affairs sources note that many in the party were 
genuinely taken aback at the level of violence their rhetoric 
produced, with the attack on the UN convoy being of great 
concern. Second, and related, is that although actions in 
protest of the new government caused extensive disruption in the 
East, this still involved a relatively small number while 
efforts to mobilized mass demonstrations at a national level 
quickly fizzled, with less than 100 showing up for two days of 
Dili protests, indicating that the party lacked serious 
mobilization power beyond its eastern base.  Third is the fact 
that FRETILIN is intensely conscious of its public and 
international image.  Despite a concerted public relations 
campaign following the announcement of the AMP government, it 
became clear that the international community, domestic public 
and media, and international media all saw FRETILIN as the clear 
culprit in the violence and was unresponsive to the assertion 
that the AMP Government was illegitimate. 
 
¶5. (C) Nonetheless, FRETILIN clearly still intends to keep the 
pressure on the AMP government.  Although the leadership made it 
clear that no legal challenge of the AMP government is in the 
offing, it continues to hammer home its message that the AMP is 
unconstitutional.  Along with this, FRETILIN members have been 
pointing frequently at the pro-autonomy records of several AMP 
members of government.  These persons allegedly supported 
Special Autonomy status within Indonesia rather than 
independence for Timor-Leste at the time of the 1999 referendum. 
 FRETILIN MP David Ximenes has told us that the party will 
target these formerly pro-autonomy individuals in order to 
publicly undermine the government; new graffiti around Dili 
already lists specific ministers and secretaries of state, 
including: Minister of Education Joao Cancio, Secretary of State 
for Defense Julio Thomas Pinto, Secretary of State for Security 
Francisco Guterrres, and CNRT MP Carmelita Moniz.  Following an 
initial walk-out after after FRETILIN candidates lost votes for 
Parliamentary leadership posts, FRETILIN MPs began to return to 
the plenary in earnest on August 20.  However, their 
participation remains half-hearted with continued high absence 
rates.  Somewhat contradictorily, they have also demonstrated 
that they plan to play hardball, raising difficult questions in 
the plenary and pushing hard for the leadership of strategic 
committees.   Along with the overt pressure, FRETILIN sources 
frequently note the fragility of most coalition governments, and 
express doubt regarding how long this one can last.  Overall, 
FRETILIN can be expected to be watching closely and looking for 
weak points it can exploit with an eye toward AMP failure and 
consequent FRETILIN resurgence long before five-year mandate up. 
 
Change in the air? 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) In its public presentation, FRETILIN has generally 
maintained a united front.  But Embassy sources indicate that 
behind the scenes, unhappiness with Alkatiri's leadership and 
 
DILI 00000306  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
the fact that FRETLIN's base has been cut in half since 2001 are 
feeding a desire for change in the party's inner circles.  Of 
particular note is Ana Pessoa, the previous Minister for State 
Administration who has long been viewed as one of Alkatiri's 
closest allies. Post has obtained notes from a meeting on August 
14 in which Pessoa elaborated on her criticisms of Alkatiri, 
stating, "If we weren't so arrogant, we wouldn't be in this 
situation."  She reportedly said that Alkatiri had failed to 
negotiate effectively during government formation discussions 
and that over the longer term he had created a bad environment 
with Xanana Gusmao against her advice.  (She also had a few 
choice words regarding former Interior Minister Lobato, noting 
that "What is happening to the party is also a consequence of 
his attitudes.  Rogerio Lobato is not a bad guy, but he is 
crazy.")  Estanislau da Silva, the previous Minister of 
Agriculture and briefly Prime Minister, is also said to be 
increasingly unhappy with Alkatiri's leadership. 
 
¶7. (C) At least equally significant is the potential emergence 
of FRETILIN's younger generation, who could seek to unseat the 
current leadership. Alkatiri has himself emphasized to us that 
the party is working to prepare the next generation of leaders, 
a priority reflected in recent leadership decisions. This 
includes Arsenio Bano being elected to the party's vice 
president position and Aniceto Guterres, currently FRETILIN 
caucas leader, being put forward as FRETLIN's candidate for 
President of Parliament. Both are among a group of capable 
younger party leaders whose background links them strongly with 
Renetil, the pro-independence movement established by Timorese 
students in Indonesia in the 1990s that is most strongly linked 
with the Democratic Party (PD).  Bano's and Guterres' rise 
within FRETILIN has been accompanied by them publicly becoming 
more hard line and loyal to the current leadership, leading many 
of their former activist colleagues to regard them as having 
abandoned their ideals.  However, a highly reliable source very 
close to the party leadership paints a different picture, noting 
that from the outside they may appear to be staunchly 
pro-Alkatiri, but the way that they are moving within the party 
indicates that they are aiming to change things. So long as 
Alkatiri retains his position and support base, however, they 
will have to tread a very careful line, overtly demonstrating 
their loyalty while working carefully behind the scenes. 
 
¶8. (C) Both Bano and Guterres have hinted at this dynamic in 
conversations with Emboffs, with Bano stressing the need for a 
smooth transition to the new generation, while Guterres has on 
several occasions stated that his position within the party 
remains potentially precarious.  During a recent meeting he 
emphasized, "I am not radical [as many have now labeled him], 
but I'm still a guest in the house."  According to the 
above-referenced source, Bano, Guterres and other like-minded 
members of FRETILIN's younger generation may attempt to win over 
enough support to call for an extraordinary congress to elect 
new leadership before the current leadership's five-year mandate 
is up in 2011. A national party consolidation meeting planned 
for early September may present them with this opportunity. 
(Note: The internal FRETILIN opposition group, Mudansa, has long 
been calling for an extraordinary congress, but Post assesses 
its ability to force leadership change in the party as marginal. 
 FRETILIN Mudansa's very public opposition has placed it 
squarely outside of the circles from which internal changes can 
be made.  Nonetheless, they have made themselves a consistent 
irritant and have opened up the possibility for many FRETILIN 
members to oppose current leadership while maintaining their 
FRETILIN identity.  If the younger generation makes a serious 
move, it is likely that the broader Mudansa community, to 
include those not explicitly linked with but sympathetic to 
Mudansa, might be an important source of support.) 
 
Our approach to FRETILIN 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) FRETILIN remains the largest, best organized and most 
deeply historically rooted Timorese party.  While it has 
disruptive and sometimes destructive potential, and some very 
worrying anti-democratic tendencies, it also has some 
Timor-Leste's most committed and skilled leaders.  It will 
remain important, and could manage to be back in government 
within this five year cycle.  The USG should engage robustly 
with both the party's current leadership and its potential 
 
DILI 00000306  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
future leaders to promote good lines of communication and 
influence and to ensure that we understand as best as possible 
where it is going. Specifically we intend to: 
-- Continue to maintain regular and constructive dialogue with 
Alkatiri and all top party leadership.  Regardless of the 
increased opposition to his leadership, Alkatiri's support base 
remains strong and he will remain a central party figure for the 
foreseeable future. Periods in which we did not have regular 
contact with him led to wide perceptions of a USG anti- FRETILIN 
bias that constrained our ability to understand the political 
situation and to convey important messages. 
-- Cultivate good connections with individuals who may be 
maneuvering for change behind the scenes and may be at the top 
of the party in the future.  Within the 1975 generation or 
"Maputo group," Estanislau da Silva and Ana Pessoa are of 
particular importance.  Of the younger generation and newer 
party members, some key individuals include: Arsenio Bano, 
Aniceto Guterres, Filomeno Aleixio (formerly with the 
International Republican Institute - IRI), and Jose Texeira 
(despite professing great loyalty to Alkatiri, is also said to 
be highly sympathetic to the need to modernize the party). 
-- Hold FRETILIN leadership accountable when the party behaves 
inappropriately.  FRETILIN is a highly sensitive to its 
international image and is highly cognizant of the USG's 
potential influence.  In a context where the Embassy is 
cultivating good relations with the party on an ongoing basis, 
we will be in a strong position to convey tough messages when 
these are called for.KLEMM