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PP RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0096/01 0681024
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 091024Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3344
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0847
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0807
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0914
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0741
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0661
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0622
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0469
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2691

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000096 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/9/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KJUS UN AU VT TT
SUBJECT: DILI BISHOP SYMPATHIZES WITH REINADO 
 
REF: DILI  095 
 
DILI 00000096  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Stanley Harsha, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Bishop of Dili Alberto Ricardo da Silva told us 
in a March 9 meeting that he was reluctant to get involved in 
convincing dissident military leader Major Alfredo Reinado to 
surrender because he feared for the safety of Reinado if he 
surrenders to GOET authorities, and that the Catholic Church 
would be blamed if anything happened to Reinado.  Richardo da 
Silva's reluctance to intervene in the case also can be 
explained by his clear sympathy for Reinado as a defender of the 
downtrodden, being unjustly singled out while culpable Fretilin 
party members enjoy impunity.  We had requested this meeting in 
part because President Xanana Gusmao on March 8 had told us that 
East Timor's two bishops were playing a role in persuading 
Reinado to surrender and we wanted to find out what that role 
might be.  Da Silva also had strong concerns about the ongoing 
election process, citing delays in voter registration and the 
means to ensure that polling places are not subject to 
intimidation or violence.  He noted, however, that he and "the 
people" viewed manipulation and threats by the ruling Fretilin 
party, or by gangs working on the party's behalf, as posing a 
greater security threat than that of Reinado's rebellion, which 
he said has now dispersed.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In a March 9 meeting in the office of Bishop of Dili 
Alberto Ricardo da Silva, Charge d'Affaires (CDA) asked  da 
Silva if he is playing any role in persuading rebel military 
leader Alfredo Reinado to surrender.  Ricardo da Silva asked CDA 
what would happen if Reinado was captured, saying he feared 
getting involved in the negotiation process because the Church 
would be responsible if he surrenders and is later killed.  CDA 
told Richardo da Silva that peaceful surrender is the best 
possible outcome as the current situation is very destabilizing, 
particularly during election time.  CDA explained that the GOET 
and the International Stabilization Force (ISF) want only to 
bring Reinado in safely, and that the attention of the 
international community present in East Timor will be a further 
deterrence to any harm coming to Reinado if he surrenders. 
Finally, the CDA noted that Reinado taking up arms is simply 
wrong and that he needs to place his trust in the justice system 
if rule of law is to be respected in East Timor.  We also noted 
to Ricardo da Silva that the recent Dili District Court decision 
to sentence former Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato for 
distributing arms to civilians in May 2006 is a sign that the 
system does work, to which the Bishop responded that the appeals 
process and a possible amnesty law could still let Lobato walk 
free.  (Note:  President Xanana Gusmao on March 8 had told us 
that the two East Timor bishops were playing a role in 
persuading Reinado to surrender and we had requested meetings 
with the two bishops to find out more about that role.  See 
Reftel. We hope to meet with Baucau Bishop Basilio do 
Nascimiento on March 12.) 
 
¶3. (C) Ricardo da Silva said he had recently discussed the 
Reinado situation with Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, and that 
Ramos-Horta insisted that Reinado must surrender. Ricardo da 
Silva claimed that Ramos-Horta softened his stance towards the 
fugitive after their meeting, publicly stating the next day that 
negotiations would be possible with Reinado.  The Bishop told us 
that last summer Reinado had also paid a call on him to explain 
his intentions, leaving Ricardo da Silva convinced that Reinado 
did not pose a threat.  He assessed Reinado as a hero seeking 
justice and protection for the suffering people from FreQlin 
excesses.  (Note: Ricardo da Silva was among the Church leaders 
who organized a multi-week, protest involving up to 20,000 
demonstrators against the then Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, in 
April-May 2005 and are regular critics of Alkatiri and the 
Fretilin party.) Though he agreed that Reinado should not flaunt 
the law, he indicated that he considered Reinado far less 
culpable than many others who remained free, including Alkatiri. 
 The Bishop trusted Reinado's public promises to turn himself in 
once others had been brought to justice.  He said he has not 
talked with Reinado recently and that he does not know how to 
contact him directly. 
 
 
DILI 00000096  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶4. (C) In response to our assertion that the current situation 
is creating an unstable and volatile climate that could hinder 
elections, Ricardo da Silva responded that Reinado's group has 
dispersed, is no longer a threat and that Reinado supports 
peaceful and free elections.  On the contrary, he claimed that 
Fretilin is causing civil disorder in a desperate gambit to 
disrupt elections because of flagging public support.  He 
pointed to a variety of reports he had received from priests in 
the districts indicating that Fretilin, or elements linked to 
it, were stockpiling weapons and intimidating voters.  He cited 
reports from five sub-districts in Baucau where local civil 
servants had "more guns than Reinado," as well as the presence 
of nine "long-haired men with guns" in Ermera who intimidated 
people after the local youth disrupted political activities by 
Alkatiri, who is the Fretilin Secretary-General.   He also told 
us that Fretilin supporters in Los Palos chanting "viva 
Alkatiri, viva Marxism" had protested in response to a limited 
Australian deployment there, allegedly prompting Gusmao to 
threaten to dispatch more Australian troops. 
 
¶5. (C) Ricardo da Silva claimed that he received frequent calls 
from both Father David in Same and Father Natalino in Suai, both 
of whom have been rumored by various sources to have abetted 
Reinado.  Ricardo da Silva said the priests were not Reinado 
sympathizers but rather were carrying out their priestly duties 
to attend to anyone in need.  (Note: Father Natalino is the 
priest at the church in Suai where Emboffs met with Reinado in 
December 2006.  Reinado and his men were clearly at ease in that 
environment.) 
 
¶6. (C) The Bishop said the current social situation is "bad, but 
the Church has hope."  He described significant poverty and 
suffering, with refugees congregating near religious facilities 
for nearly a year.  He said the current government did not have 
the capability to handle the problems it faces. 
 
¶7. (C) Ricardo da Silva read us a prepared list of election 
concerns, asking for USG assistance in pressuring the Government 
of East Timor and the United Nations.  He informed us that the 
upcoming elections were very important to the people of East 
Timor, but reports from the villages indicated that voter 
registration was not going well, particularly in the western 
districts.  He complained that the "Fretilin-run" Technical 
Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE) was inaccurately 
 
SIPDIS 
telling people that registration cards from the national 
assembly elections in 2001 did not need to be renewed, and asked 
for USG assistance in ensuring that the registration period be 
extended as many voters will not have time to register before 
the April 9 presidential elections.  (Note: STAE is under the 
Ministry for State Administration, headed by Fretilin hardliner 
Anna Pessoa, hence the Bishop's characterization of it as 
"Fretilin run".) He plainly stated that "the people fear 
Fretilin's manipulation" and "Fretilin are the ones that do not 
want people to vote."  Ricardo da Silva also asked CDA to 
consider whether the UN advisors have sufficient experience to 
ensure a fair election, negatively comparing this election 
process with the referendum on independence that the UN carried 
out in 1999.  Furthermore, the Bishop insisted that there must 
be regulations to prevent members of the East Timorese military 
(F-FDTL) from visiting polling stations on polling day, saying 
that this would intimidate voters.  When we asked him if the 
Church would support any political party in these elections, he 
said that it could not endorse any parties, but that the Church 
is required to help parishioners make a good choice, and 
therefore could advise voters to chose a party that cared about 
the people, not just about a small circle of elites. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment:  Bishop Ricardo da Silva clearly distrusts 
Fretilin and apparently supports much of what Reinado claims are 
his goals. While we do not take all of his anti-Fretilin claims 
at face value, they demonstrate the extent to which 
disillusionment with the ruling party and sympathy for anyone 
who will challenge them can impact even a mainstream, 
influential religious leader.  We have no doubt that Bishop 
Ricardo da Silva will likely use the influence at his disposal 
to urge voters to oppose Fretilin in the upcoming presidential 
and parliamentary elections.  What remains to be seen, however, 
is the degree to which he can influence a far-flung network of 
 
DILI 00000096  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
priests, many of whom are independently-minded.  Embassy Dili 
plans to meet next week with Bishop Nascimento, who is based in 
Baucau, as well as with lower-level church figures to gauge 
where they stand on Reinado and the range of political issues 
discussed with Ricardo da Silva. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Bio Notes:  Bishop Ricardo da Silva will turn 64 in 
April and has spent nearly his entire career in East Timor.  He 
attended seminary in Macau before being ordained in 1972. From 
1972 to his appointment as Bishop in May 2004, Ricardo da Silva 
served in East Timor, except for the period from 1993-1994, when 
he served at the Vatican. During his Vatican posting, he visited 
Providence, Rhode Island, and Washington, DC, where he told us 
he testified before a Senate committee.  He speaks Tetum, 
heavily-accented but proficient English, and possibly Bahasa 
Indonesia. 
HARSHA