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FM AMEMBASSY DILI
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INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0743
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0841
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0681
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0776
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0603
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0569
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2537

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS 
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/12/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KJUS ID UN TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR: OBSTACLES TO ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
DILI 00000008  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: W. Gary Gray, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy 
Dili, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary.  While there are indications that East Timor's 
Prosecutor-General genuinely desires to pursue justice for 
crimes related to the April-May 2006 events, he is said to be 
under strong pressure from the political elite not to do so, and 
to fear for his personal safety.  He is therefore anxious to 
pass responsibility on to international personnel for the 
investigations and prosecutions recommended by the UN Commission 
of Inquiry (COI) report.  A respected Norwegian former Deputy 
Prosecutor-General here is having second thoughts about 
returning to the position, given concerns that she will be 
undermined by the Government.  Serious obstacles to 
accountability originate as far back as killings related to the 
1975 civil war, and some see a link between the continuing 
impunity in regard to the 1999 events and the country's 
inability to deal with more recent violations of law.  The 
legacy of lawlessness from the Indonesian occupation, the 
general lack of appreciation of the role of rule of law and 
accountability among the ruling elite, a perception of F-FDTL 
impunity, and the weakness and vulnerability to intimidation of 
the country's nascent legal system all suggest that there will 
be little impetus from the Timorese side to implement the 
recommendations of the COI.  Many ordinary Timorese and 
political activists nevertheless continue to press for justice 
in regard to 1999 and 2006 crimes and virtually everyone wants 
to see an end to the relative impunity enjoyed by gangs whose 
violence perpetuates a climate of fear in Dili.  Underlying all 
this, however, is a vicious circle of impunity and fear plaguing 
all levels of society and concerns that political actors 
threatened with prosecution are capable of provoking organized 
violence in retaliation. While the international judges and 
prosecutors who currently dominate the judicial system here 
could push through investigations and prosecutions over the 
objections of the ruling political and security force elite, the 
UN and international community will have to be prepared to deal 
with the kind of situation seen on January 12, when about 100 
F-FDTL, some armed, appeared at the Dili district courthouse 
during a preliminary hearing for F-FDTL suspects in the May 25, 
2006 shooting of PNTL officers. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Charge met on January 11 with Siri Frigaard, a Norwegian 
prosecutor who was Deputy Prosecutor General and Chief of the 
Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) here during the UNTAET period.  She is 
considering an offer to return in that position, whose current 
job description involves investigation and prosecution of crimes 
related to the April-May events, but does not pertain to the 
revived SCU or the 1999 crimes.  Frigaard's main concern was 
that the GOET would not be supportive of her efforts, viewing 
her only as a "scapegoat" to deflect attention and 
responsibility away from the Timorese actors in the process. 
Frigaard has maintained a close and amicable relationship with 
Timorese Prosecutor-General Longuinhos Monteiro, and unlike some 
other observers here, she believes that Monteiro has a sincere 
desire to pursue justice for the April-May 2006 cases.  She said 
Monteiro was under extreme pressure from the ruling Fretilin 
elite, however, and was "very afraid" for his own safety. 
Monteiro was therefore anxious to have responsibility for the 
COI-recommended investigations and prosecutions diverted to 
international personnel. 
 
¶3. (C) While her prospective position would not address the 1999 
crimes, Frigaard sees the lack of real accountability for these 
crimes as reinforcing the continuing overall atmosphere of 
impunity here.  She was skeptical regarding the revived SCU, 
maintaining that it would only be capable of carrying out 
investigations and submitting the results to Monteiro's office, 
which would merely add to the backlog of cases there.  She said 
the renewed SCU seemed to lack any apparatus for carrying out 
its logistical needs, such as the procurement of warrants.  She 
maintained that her discussions with the current UNMIT 
leadership regarding the SCU had not dispelled her impression 
that the unit had been re-established in response to 
international pressure, but that the UN itself lacked the will 
to wholeheartedly support the enterprise.  She was under no 
illusions regarding the GOET attitude toward the SCU, recalling 
that in mid-2005 former Prime Minister Alkatiri had bluntly 
responded "no" when she asked if he supported its continuation 
 
DILI 00000008  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
and that current PM Ramos-Horta had told her he held her in high 
regard but did not support her objectives.  She added that 
President Gusmao, despite his public statements on the need for 
reconciliation with Indonesia to take precedence over justice, 
had indicated to her privately that he genuinely wanted to see 
accountability for the 1999 crimes but for political reasons 
could not say this publicly. 
 
¶4. (C) Frigaard expressed serious concern about the terms of 
reference for the Indonesia-East Timor Truth and Friendship 
Commission (TFC) which give the TFC access to SCU case files. 
She characterized this as a betrayal of the absolute assurances 
of confidentiality SCU had given victims and witnesses during 
previous investigations. (Note: Our recent conversations with 
the Timorese TFC commissioners suggest that the TFC, though 
recently renewed for another year, is largely moribund and 
unlikely to make any real inroads into files here, or in 
Indonesia.) 
 
¶5. (C) Frigaard said her many discussions with Timorese on these 
issues had convinced her that the 1999 events could not be 
addressed in isolation from what had occurred in previous years, 
stretching as far back as the brief but bloody 1975 civil war. 
While she agreed that in most cases achieving actual convictions 
of perpetrators, especially those currently residing across the 
border in Indonesia, was an unrealistic expectation, she argued 
that it was nevertheless important to continue with 
investigations and indictments so that the truth would be known, 
which in itself would satisfy many of the Timorese victims. 
 
¶6. (C) There are serious obstacles here to the kind of 
accountability Frigaard advocates.  Few in the political elite 
wish to revisit to killings related to the 1975 civil war.  This 
was evident during the CAVR hearings, when the relevant 
political actors were careful not to delve into these issues in 
any substantive manner.  In addition to the political 
motivations behind the reluctance to confront the crimes of the 
1975-1999 era, longstanding cultural and systemic factors 
severely complicate efforts to address impunity.  Among the 
political class in general there is little understanding or 
appreciation of the value of rule of law and the need for 
accountability.  The legacy of lawlessness originates not only 
from the Indonesian occupation but also from the experience of 
the returning exiles in places like Mozambique and the mindsets 
of the former resistance fighters, who, as F-FDTL commander Taur 
Matan Ruak has graphically described to us, tended to resolve 
their internal differences via armed confrontations. There is 
also a strong tendency, promoted especially by the President, to 
see "reconciliation" rather than discipline and accountability 
as the way to address incidents such as armed clashes between 
F-FDTL and police. 
 
¶7. (C) Despite the COI findings and recommendations, the GOET 
has rushed to "normalize" the F-FDTL and declare it cleared of 
any wrongdoing in the April-May events. The flip side of the 
increasing glorification of the role of the armed resistance in 
the struggle for independence seems to be a perception, shared 
by both the F-FDTL itself and the ruling political elite, that 
the defense forces are above the law.  Political leaders also 
are likely see any attempt to confront F-FDTL on accountability 
issues as too dangerous.  The virtually complete failure to 
punish any F-FDTL personnel for many incidents of abusive and 
criminal behavior over the past several years has strongly 
reinforced this image of impunity.  This also applies to some 
extent to the National Police (PNTL).  Unlike the F-FDTL the 
PNTL has internal disciplinary systems.  However, the weakness 
of these systems combined with political manipulation and the 
juciciary's reluctance to hold police accountable has 
contributed to sense of impunity within that institution as well. 
 
¶8. (C) All of the above, along with the country's weak legal 
system and the vulnerability of its Timorese judges and 
prosecutors to political pressure and personal threats, strongly 
suggest that there will be little impetus from the Timorese side 
to implement the recommendations of the COI.  Many ordinary 
Timorese and political activists nevertheless continue to press 
 
DILI 00000008  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
for justice in regard to the 1999 and 2006 crimes and virtually 
everyone wants to see an end to the relative impunity enjoyed by 
violent gangs whose activities perpetuate a climate of fear in 
Dili.  A judge in the ongoing trial of former Interior Minister 
Rogerio Lobato opened the second day's proceedings by giving 
strong assurances to the witnesses that they and their families 
would be provided protection by UNPOL.  This highlighted one of 
the most serious obstacles to rule of law here -- the vicious 
circle of impunity and fear plaguing all levels of society. 
Even in regard to more ordinary criminal cases, it is extremely 
difficult to convince people to testify and put themselves at 
risk of violent retributions from which they feel they have no 
protection. On a more macro level, there is concern that higher 
level political actors threatened with prosecution can mobilize 
more organized violence and further undermine the overall 
stability of the country as a whole. 
 
¶9. (C) If Frigaard does accept the Deputy Prosecutor position, 
as many of us here are urging her to do, she will need strong, 
consistent backing from the international community, including 
interventions with the GOET and possibly UNMIT as well to head 
off any attempts to undermine her efforts.  It is likely that 
similar diplomatic efforts will be required to ensure that the 
revived SCU operation does not sink into irrelevance.  The 
international judges and prosecutors who currently dominate the 
judicial system here could push through investigations and 
prosecutions relating to last year's April-May events over the 
objections of the ruling political and security force elite.  In 
this case, however, the UN and other international entities here 
may have to be prepared to deal with the kind of situation seen 
on January 12, when about 100 F-FDTL, some armed, were 
circulating inside and in the vicinity of the Dili district 
courthouse during a pre-indictment hearing for F-FDTL suspects 
in the May 25, 2006 shooting of PNTL officers. 
GRAY