VZCZCXRO1155
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0578/01 3331103
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291103Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3136
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0748
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0815
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0719
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0546
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0579
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0657
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0442
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2474

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000578 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM MARR KPKO TT
SUBJECT: MULTIPLE DIALOGUE INITIATIVES ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS TIMOR 
CRISIS 
 
 
DILI 00000578  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Recent weeks have seen a flurry of dialogue 
and reconciliation efforts among East Timorese institutions and 
leaders.  These have included series of meetings between the 
armed forces (F-FDTL) and the national police (PNTL), 
initiatives by youth group and gang leaders, and a high level 
dialogue last week involving all major political actors except 
perhaps the most important one, former Prime Minister Mari 
Alkatiri.  The Church leadership also failed to show.  All of 
these efforts have been organized with overarching coordination 
from the President's National Dialogue initiative, with the high 
level dialogue event receiving significant support from the 
Madrid Club with funding from the European Union.  There is 
broad consensus on the necessity and value of such initiatives, 
but also some concerns.  There are fears that the security 
institution dialogue is simultaneously serving as a mechanism 
for prematurely reactivating the F-FDTL, and bypassing 
accountability.  The youth group dialogue is vital to reduce 
violent incidents in Dili, but not all key groups are 
participating in the initiative.  The high level dialogue ended 
without much clarity as to next steps or any clear 
accomplishments.  Whether it has further dividends will most 
likely rest on if it results in dialogue between Alkatiri and 
President Xanana Gusmao.  End Summary. 
 
Reconciliation between the armed forces and police 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The first significant move in series of reconciliation 
initiatives over recent weeks was a one-on-one meeting between 
President Gusmao and Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak in the 
first week of November, the first meeting of its kind since the 
beginning of the crisis.  According to Prime Minister Jose 
Ramos-Horta, the two had been willing to meet for some time, but 
neither was willing to take the initiative.  Ramos-Horta reports 
that he therefore made the arrangements, even going so far as to 
go and pick up Ruak to convey him to the meeting.  No one else 
was in the room to report on the conversation, but both men 
reported being very happy with the discussion and agreed to move 
ahead with a reconciliation process between the F-FDTL and the 
PNTL. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Gusmao then hosted at his home a series of gatherings 
over a three-day period, with nearly 80 members of the F-FDTL 
including all top leadership on November 8, a similar number of 
PNTL also including top leadership on the 9th, and finally with 
both groups together on the 10th.  This was followed by a joint 
parade on November 15 involving about 300 of each in front of 
the Government Palace and presided over by the President, Prime 
Minister and President of Parliament.  The initial very public 
F-FDTL-PNTL reconciliation was then followed by a number of 
further meetings involving the security institutions' leadership 
as well as political parties and youth groups.  The main 
discussion at these meetings was on how the security 
institutions could work together with the various youth groups 
to define and implement confidence building measures within 
communities and internally displaced person (IDP) camps. 
However, to date it is unclear whether any specific steps have 
been agreed upon.  Proposals that the F-FDTL and PNTL should 
conduct joint visits to communities and camps to demonstrate 
their new-found commitment to peace, were rejected by the youth 
leaders as premature and possibly inflammatory. 
 
¶4. (SBU) There has been wide acknowledgement of this 
institutional reconciliation as a positive and necessary step in 
principle.  However, a number of concerns have been raised 
regarding the way the process is proceeding and possible 
pitfalls.  Primary concerns focus on the F-FDTL, as it is the 
institution that seems to be gaining immediately from the 
reconciliation, while the PNTL remains largely (although not 
entirely) contained by UNPOL and its vetting and reintegration 
process.  It is apparent that the Ramos-Horta government and 
Ruak used the reconciliation events as a spring board to 
reassert the F-FDTL, which has now been granted rights to move 
about freely, and armed, in Dili for routine business (they are 
not to be involved in any law enforcement).  Ramos-Horta has 
 
DILI 00000578  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
repeatedly emphasized his support of "normalization" for the 
F-FDTL, declaring that they should have same privileges as 
foreign off-duty troops to carry weapons in city. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Another concern, primarily voiced by the PNTL, is that 
throughout the various meetings between the two institutions, 
F-FDTL officers have been allowed to carry weapons while all 
PNTL officers remain unarmed under current UNPOL arrangements. 
Self-suspended National Police Commander Paulo Martins expressed 
particular dismay at this and at one point refused to continue 
to participate in the meetings.  This was again the case at the 
November 28 independence day event at the main stadium (reported 
septel) , which featured about 100 armed F-FDTL flanked by a 
lesser number of unarmed PNTL.  A number of PNTL officers have 
noted that this creates a fundamentally unequal dynamic between 
the two institutions.  An additional concern, expressed both by 
many PNTL members and others, is that reconciliation and 
"normalization" of the F-FDTL will be used to bypass judicial 
accountability, in particular for the top leadership who were 
all recommended for prosecution for illegal weapons distribution 
in the UN Commission of Inquiry report.  This worry has been 
underscored by recent statements from Ramos-Horta who has 
described the report as exonerating the F-FDTL (by concluding 
that there was no F-FDTL massacre on April 28), and seems to be 
willfully ignoring the report's other findings on the F-FDTL. 
 
Concurrent youth group initiatives 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) Concurrent with the development of the F-FDTL - PNTL 
dialogue, an "independent" reconciliation initiative sprung up 
among a number of youth groups (a term that in Dili encompasses 
a range from church groups to neighborhood gangs to large 
martial arts organizations).  This initiative was at least 
partially organized by the President's Youth Commission for 
Dialogue.  Prominent in this initiative were several 
neighborhood gang leaders who have played alternately 
destructive and constructive roles, including Joao Becora, 
Jacinto Kulao and Alito Rambo.  A number of youth involved in 
this initiative participated in the November 15 F-FDTL - PNTL 
parade, distributing flowers at the end of the ceremony.  They 
also organized a series of peace marches during the weekend of 
November 12, "National Youth Day" and the anniversary of the 
Santa Cruz massacre.  Beyond these mostly symbolic activities, 
these youth leaders have become increasingly involved in 
community dialogue processes to encourage the return of IDPs. 
However, there has concurrently been increased combative 
rhetoric among some of these groups indicating the potential 
fragility of their peace efforts and the likelihood of 
additional violent clashes between them. 
 
High-level dialogue 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) The Madrid Club, with funding by the European Union, has 
been for several months, in coordination with the President's 
National Dialogue initiative, pushing to bring about a series of 
dialogues involving mid- and high-level political and societal 
leaders.  The initial series of mid-level meetings had only 
token participation by the ruling Fretilin party, and was 
ultimately overshadowed by the simultaneous F-FDTL-PNTL 
initiative described above.  The high-level dialogue held last 
week was comparatively more successful, involving as it did all 
important political actors currently in country, including key 
members of Fretilin's top leadership.  However, Fretilin 
Secretary General and former Prime Minister Alkatiri's absence, 
 
SIPDIS 
reportedly for medical treatment in Portugal, was a major gap. 
 
Don't count on the Church 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Lutheran  Bishop Gunnar Stalsett of Oslo and Former 
Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs attempted to set the tone 
during their opening speeches.  Stalsett, a member of the Nobel 
Prize Committee who is playing an active role here in the 
 
DILI 00000578  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
dialogue process, is supporting though not directly involved in 
the Madrid Club effort.  He relayed a tough message regarding 
the emptiness of "reconciliation" without truth or justice. 
Birkavs, who is leading the Madrid Club effort, made a robust 
presentation about looking to the future not the past, the 
meaning of leadership, and the need to work together with 
political enemies.  However, they essentially stepped back and 
let the meeting run itself from there, with the President's 
Chief of Staff officially mediating.  With no clear agenda or 
structure for the meeting, nor any preparatory work before 
bringing together such a large group, much of the event devolved 
into a series of familiar speeches and political posturing by 
the participants.  At a November 23 briefing hosted by the 
Embassy for the diplomatic community and UNMIT officials, 
Birkavs said that it is not clear to the Madrid Club where to go 
from here.  He noted, however, that many of the participants had 
expressed desire for continued dialogue with an emphasis on the 
need to arrange smaller meetings to allow freer conversation. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Catholic Church leadership also was notably absent 
from the high-level dialogue, the bishops having pulled out at 
the last moment and only mid-level Church leadership in 
attendance, which the organizers regarded as a major setback. 
It was not clear why the Church backed out, but recently the 
local bishops seem to be increasingly shying away from any 
activities even remotely related to politics.  This is not true 
of the former Bishop of Dili, Carlos Belo, who reportedly will 
return here for a Nobel Prize commemoration on December 10. 
According to Bishop Stalsett, Belo was disappointed by the 
results of his visit here last month, when he failed to make any 
inroads with rebel leader Alfredo Reinado and was severely taken 
aback when a group of youths stopped his car in Dili and treated 
him disrespectfully, something he had never experienced here 
before. 
 
The missing piece: Gusmao and Alkatiri 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) There is a widespread sense, at all levels of society, 
that until Xanana Gusmao and Mari Alkatiri can reach a workable 
modus vivendi, other reconciliation efforts, while important, 
remain built on weak foundations.  However, getting the two to 
talk has remained an elusive goal.  In a conversation with a 
Madrid Club official in late October, Alkatiri stated that he 
regarded the UN Commission of Inquiry report as invalidating 
dialogue because it was biased against him and his allies, but 
then stated that he would be willing to meet with Gusmao once 
the Prosecutor General had completed the investigation into 
allegations of his involvement in illegal arms distribution, and 
if they met first informally and as equals.  Meanwhile, although 
Gusmao has been overtly supportive of dialogue, he has likewise 
demonstrated reluctance to engage directly with Alkatiri. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Thus, perhaps the most significant outcome of last 
week's high-level dialogue was an explicit commitment made for 
dialogue between the two men.  State Administration Minister Ana 
Pessoa, who spoke early in the day, regretted the absence of 
Alkatiri and remarked on the need to have a dialogue between 
Alkatiri and Gusmao.  (Pessoa is very close to Alkatiri and her 
statement in this context can be assumed to represent Alkatiri.) 
 In his speech toward the end of the day, Gusmao noted his 
agreement with Pessoa that the high-level dialogue ideally 
should have included Alkatiri.  He then stated that he would 
make every effort to bring about a meeting with Alkatiri on the 
latter's return.  Whether or not such a meeting can begin to 
narrow their differences remains to be seen, especially in light 
of the ongoing public rhetoric coming from both of them.  Many 
observers regard the two to be in a struggle to the political 
death.  Alkatiri is regarded as determined to hold onto power at 
all costs and Gusmao's intent to possibly form a new party 
appears to be based on his calculation that this may be the only 
way to ensure a Fretilin defeat in next year's national 
elections.  In this context finding common ground for productive 
dialogue will be difficult. 
GRAY