VZCZCXRO7059
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHLB #0281/01 0310903
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 310903Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1759
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0436
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000281 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
LONDON FOR TSOU 
PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL LE SY SA
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  WASHINGTON-BOUND JUMBLATT REACHING OUT TO 
AOUN, WAITING FOR SA'AD HARIRI TO RETURN 
 
REF: BEIRUT 241 
 
BEIRUT 00000281  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S) In a 1/28 meeting, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt 
described his efforts to find a candidate for an upcoming 
parliamentary by-election on which both his "March 14" allies 
and Michel Aoun can agree.  He reiterated his belief that 
Sa'ad Hariri needs to return to Lebanon, but not before 
soothing the feelings of the "annoyed" Saudi leadership 
(which maintains a stranglehold on Hariri finances).  Seeing 
Hizballah content to maintain a "balance of terror" against 
the March 14 forces, he described Prime Minister Siniora's 
strategy for bringing boycotting Shi'a ministers back to the 
cabinet as ill-advised, and said Siniora's proposed 
memorandum of understanding with those ministers takes the 
country "back to square one."  He warned us of a new 
disinformation campaign against the UN International 
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), and described 
his plans to visit Washington in early March.  End summary. 
 
DEALING WITH AOUN ON THE BAABDA-ALEY RACE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) Called on by the Ambassador and emboff at his 
residence in Moukhtara on January 28, Walid Jumblatt said he 
would try to seek a compromise candidate between the Aoun and 
March 14 forces to fill the late Edmond Na'eem's seat in a 
parliamentary by-election for the Ba'abda-Aley district.  The 
question was:  would Aoun agree to one?  Jumblatt expected 
Aoun to oppose newscaster and assassination attempt survivor 
May Chidiac as a candidate, since she was the nominee of 
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja'.  Liberal Party leader 
Dory Chamoun -- son of President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958) 
and the other announced contender for the seat -- "won't get 
many votes," Jumblatt said. 
 
¶3.  (S) Even though two "March 14" candidates with no chance 
of getting Aoun's support -- Chidiac and Chamoun -- were 
already in the race, there was still a chance of finding a 
consensus candidate, according to Jumblatt.  Former Beirut 
Bar Association head Shakib Qortbawi, "a patriot," fit the 
bill.  Former MP Salah Honein (whom Jumblatt unceremoniously 
dumped from his candidate list in the 2005 parliamentary 
elections in order to make room for Lebanese Forces 
candidates) was also good, but Jumblatt doubted that Aoun 
would accept him.  Jumblatt was not enthusiastic about former 
MP Pierre Dakkash (whom Aoun described as a possible 
compromise candidate in a January 29 television interview). 
The problem was that Aoun would reject even Qortbawi's 
candidacy if it were Jumblatt's initiative.  The trick would 
be to get Qortbawi nominated by Aoun's side, Jumblatt 
suggested. 
 
¶4.  (S) Failing a compromise candidate, the outlook was not 
promising.  If the March 14 and Aounist forces ran opposing 
candidates, "this time the Shi'ites will be massively against 
us while the Christian vote will be divided."  In addition, 
the election would be cast as a struggle between Jumblatt and 
Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah -- one which, given 
Hizballah's ability to tip the balance in a district roughly 
evenly divided among Shi'a Muslims, Christians, and Druze -- 
Jumblatt and the "March 14" forces would humiliatingly lose. 
 
¶5.  (S) To avoid this possibility, it would be worth it to 
"sell Aoun one more MP" in Ba'abda-Aley if Aoun and the March 
14 side could agree on a common candidate.  Aoun was being as 
difficult as ever, however:  "nothing embarrasses him!" 
Jumblatt continued, "Suddenly (Aoun) decided to forget about 
(UNSCR) 1559, suddenly he decided to support foreign hostage 
taking!"  (Note:  Jumblatt was referring to unguarded 
comments Aoun made on New TV that seemed to justify 
Hizballah's taking of hostages in the 1980s.  End note.) 
Even so, the March 14 forces would continue to try to work 
with him.  "We will be sending him a message" soon, he said. 
Aoun's real problem in the March 14 forces was with Samir 
Ja'ja'.  Personal relations between Aoun and Ja'ja' were bad, 
and there was tension on the ground between the rank-and-file 
of Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement and that of Ja'ja''s 
Lebanese Forces. 
 
BEIRUT 00000281  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Aoun's current insistence on dialogue and consensus 
on all issues threatened to bring the political process to a 
halt for "years," Jumblatt said.  Even so, Jumblatt admitted, 
Aoun "has a point" in his criticism of the Siniora 
government's handling of certain recent high-level 
appointments in the Interior Ministry, all of which had gone 
to Hariri-oriented Sunni Muslims. 
 
SA'AD HARIRI AND THE SAUDIS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Jumblatt thought it important that Sa'ad Hariri reach 
out to Aoun in person.  Even more important, however, was 
that Hariri use his connections to placate a Saudi leadership 
that was "annoyed" by the demise of its most recent (comment: 
 and unhelpful) attempt to mediate between Lebanon and Syria. 
 The Saudis were "panicked," and that explained their attempt 
to broker an understanding between Syria and Lebanon on 
Syrian terms.  "They're terribly rich, and afraid," Jumblatt 
said of the Saudi leadership.  The Saudi ambassador in 
Lebanon, a key player in the mediation process who outraged 
Siniora and the March 14 forces with a well-publicized call 
on the disgraced President Lahoud January 24, appeared to be 
"listening too much to Nasrallah." 
 
¶8.  (S) Jumblatt said Hariri had called him the night before 
from Washington (January 27) to say that his meeting with 
President Bush had been "excellent."  "I said 'okay,'" 
Jumblatt recalled, "'but don't forget about King Abdullah.'" 
Until Hariri soothed Saudi feelings, he would continue to be 
"squeezed" by the Kingdom, which -- by Jumblatt's account -- 
owed Hariri something in the range of USD 4 billion. 
 
¶9.  (S) Jumblatt expressed frustration with Sa'ad Hariri's 
continuing absence from Lebanon.  Hariri had given no 
indication of when he might return, and time was running out 
to make plans for February 14, the first anniversary of his 
father Rafiq Hariri's assassination.  Were Sa'ad Hariri in 
Lebanon by February 14, it would be appropriate to stage a 
massive rally on that day.  With him absent, it was not clear 
how to commemorate the event. 
 
¶10.  (S) Hariri's presence was essential to keep the Sunni 
community firmly in the "March 14" camp.  "I can't replace 
him" in that capacity, Jumblatt noted.  It would also allow 
him to put some direction back into the political party 
founded by Sa'ad's father Rafiq, the Future Current, which is 
now "completely disorganized."   It would also allow him to 
use his family's financial resources more effectively.  For 
example, Hariri could spend the money he would otherwise pay 
"staying a week at the Athenee" -- the exclusive Paris hotel 
that has become something of an alternate "March 14" 
headquarters -- in politically useful patronage in Lebanon's 
remote, impoverished, predominantly Sunni Akkar region, 
Jumblatt said. 
 
CABINET CRISIS AND HIZBALLAH 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) The Ambassador described as seriously flawed and 
dangerous the draft memorandum of understanding, described in 
previous reporting, that Prime Minister Siniora hopes will 
make possible the return of the cabinet's Hizballah- and Amal 
Movement-aligned Shi'a ministers and so end the cabinet 
crisis.  The paper, as currently drafted, states that 
Hizballah is not a militia (and therefore not subject to 
UNSCR 1559's requirement to disarm).  In which case, Jumblatt 
said, "we're back to square one."  The fact that Siniora 
continued to offer this concession to Hizballah suggested 
that he was "badly advised," Jumblatt added. 
 
¶12.  (S) Jumblatt described Hizballah as maintaining a 
"balance of terror," and sending a message to the March 14 
forces along the lines of "we're here, we have a state within 
a state, go to hell."  He saw Speaker of Parliament and Amal 
Movement leader Nabih Berri taking a position in favor of 
"reshuffling" the 1989 Ta'if Agreement in a way that would 
require consensus for practically any cabinet decision of 
consequence.  "If you want to have a cup of coffee, we need 
consensus," said Jumblatt, describing the extreme to which 
Berri seemed to be going.  Jumblatt said he was not in 
contact with Berri, and wondered why Berri felt compelled to 
meet Iranian President Ahmadinejad during Ahmadinejad's 
 
BEIRUT 00000281  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
recent visit to Damascus. 
 
¶13.  (S) On Nasrallah, Jumblatt asked, "How can (he) be a 
Lebanese leader with this link to the extreme left wing in 
Tehran?"  Hizballah would only grow stronger with the 
consolidation of a "Shi'ite empire" ranging from Afghanistan 
to Lebanon.  Dealing with Hizballah effectively, in his view, 
required a regional strategy.  "We need to work on Najaf," he 
said, referring to the center of Shi'a learning in Iraq.  In 
addition, it was necessary to "cut the Syrian link" that gave 
Hizballah geographic continuity, following the fall of Saddam 
Hussein's regime, with Iran. 
 
LATEST "TRICKS" 
--------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Jumblatt warned that there was "a new trick" being 
used to derail the UN investigation of Rafiq Hariri's 
assassination.  An apparent disinformation effort was taking 
the form of a "fishy story" picked by a daily "as-Safir" 
writer close to "renegade Druze" leader (and Jumblatt enemy) 
Wi'am Wahhab.  The story referred to a Palestinian currently 
living in Sweden who was allegedly involved in the Hariri 
assassination.  On the presumption that this person is an 
Israeli agent, SARG apologists would use the story to "prove" 
that -- contrary to the UNIIIC's conclusions to date -- 
Hariri had in fact been killed by Israel's Mossad.  This 
character would become "a new Hossam Hossam," claimed 
Jumblatt, referring to the UNIIIC witness whose recanting of 
his testimony was showcased by SARG officials in an attempt 
to discredit the investigation. 
 
¶15.  (S) Jumblatt claimed that, in the meantime, the SARG was 
distributing weapons in Lebanon.  Some of them had reportedly 
wound up in the hands of the Druze community's 
distant-number-two hereditary leader, "Prince" Talal Arslan. 
Asked how much of a popular following his rival, Arslan, had, 
Jumblatt answered:  "enough to create some trouble." 
 
JUMBLATT ON HAMAS ELECCTION IMPACT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) Jumblatt worried that the victory of Hamas in the 
Palestinian parliamentary elections would "radicalize" the 
Palestinian camps in Lebanon.  If Iran were to become more 
active in financing certain Palestinian factions in the 
Lebanese camps, it would "create a big problem," he said.  As 
it was, Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) had reinforced its based 
in Na'ameh, on the coast between Beirut and Sidon.  In 
addition, a suspiciously large number of Syrian "workers" -- 
800, Jumblatt claimed -- were based in a factory near 
Na'ameh, perhaps kept there in reserve in case Lebanese 
authorities attempted to disarm the Na'ameh base. 
 
WASHINGTON VISIT 
---------------- 
 
¶17.  (S) Jumblatt said that he would visit Washington during 
the first week of March for private speaking engagements, and 
would be available for meetings with USG officials from March 
6 onward.  He would see if his longtime political ally, 
Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, would be able 
to travel with him.  In any event, Jumblatt planned to depart 
Beirut for Paris, where he would spend a few days before 
departing from there for Washington.  He was also considering 
stopping in London and Cairo on his return trip, having 
received an invitation to visit the UK from British 
Ambassador James Watt.  He mused about stopping by Saudi 
Arabia as well, to help Lebanon make amends with the Saudi 
royal family. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶18.  (S) As we have maintained in previous reporting, Prime 
Minister Siniora's proposed memorandum of understanding with 
his boycotting Shi'a ministers would be a disaster if agreed 
upon.  It would immediately put the GOL in non-compliance 
with UNSCR 1559 while seemingly placing a GOL stamp of 
approval on any cross-border actions that Hizballah 
undertakes in the future.  At the same time, it would do 
nothing to prevent the Hizballah- and Amal Movement-aligned 
ministers from walking out and pulling the rug out from 
 
BEIRUT 00000281  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Siniora yet again.  The most optimistic scenario would have 
the memorandum, if agreed upon, quickly forgotten, like the 
cabinet's summer 2005 policy statement, which similarly 
offered an open-ended endorsement of Hizballah.  At the very 
least, the Siniora government should try to extract as high a 
price as possible from Hizballah and Amal in return.  Siniora 
needs to take another look at his bargaining position, to see 
how he can get Hizballah-Amal concessions on issues such as 
support for reform, credible appointments of senior personnel 
in the security sector, and removal of Lebanon's Hizballah 
apologist ambassador to the United States.  But, at this 
writing, we do not believe that Siniora has any support for 
his approach.  Not only is Walid Jumblatt, a key ally, 
opposed, but so are the Christians.  Over lunch with the 
Ambassador on 1/29, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja' noted 
that he, like Jumblatt, will not agree to Siniora's 
memorandum. 
FELTMAN